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The response to the emergence of the 2009 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic was the result of a decade of pan-
demic planning, largely centred on the threat of an 
avian influenza A(H5N1) pandemic. Based on a litera-
ture review, this study aims to define a set of new pan-
demic scenarios that could be used in case of a future 
influenza pandemic. A total of 338 documents were 
identified using a searching strategy based on seven 
combinations of keywords. Eighty-three of these docu-
ments provided useful information on the 13 virus-
related and health-system-related parameters initially 
considered for describing scenarios. Among these, 
four parameters were finally selected  (clinical attack 
rate, case fatality rate, hospital admission rate, and 
intensive care admission rate) and four different levels 
of severity for each of them were set. The definition 
of six most likely scenarios results from the combina-
tion of four different levels of severity of the four final 
parameters (256 possible scenarios). Although it has 
some limitations, this approach allows for more flex-
ible scenarios and hence it is far from the classic sce-
narios structure used for pandemic plans until 2009.
Introduction
Before the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, most 
European Union (EU) Member States had developed 
preparedness plans in order to timely respond to 
an eventual pandemic. Many of these plans involve 
explicit or implicit planning assumptions on what can 
be expected during a pandemic and on how a pan-
demic virus might behave [1].
The response to the emergence of the 2009 influ-
enza A(H1N1) pandemic was the result of a decade of 
pandemic planning, largely centred on the threat of 
an avian influenza A(H5N1) pandemic. However, the 
influenza A(H5N1) and the 2009 pandemic influenza 
A(H1N1) viruses have markedly different characteris-
tics in terms of mortality among confirmed cases and 
human-to-human transmission [2,3]. Moreover, the 
2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus caused illness 
that did not require hospitalisation in the vast majority 
of cases, and was a highly transmissible virus among 
humans spreading to several countries within days 
[3,4].
In this situation, the severity assessment applied dur-
ing the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic using a vari-
ety of indicators leading to a qualitative assessment in 
three levels (i.e. mild, moderate and severe) was not 
specific enough to guide interventions [5,6].
After the pandemic, the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) Pandemic Review Committee encour-
aged the World Health Organization (WHO) to develop 
and utilise measures to assess the severity of every 
influenza epidemic by applying, evaluating and refin-
ing tools to measure severity every year [7]. WHO has 
recently developed a new document for Pandemic 
Influenza Risk Management [8].
The 2009 influenza pandemic highlighted the impor-
tance of quantitatively defining different scenarios; 
severity should be assessed as early as possible dur-
ing a pandemic and continually re-assessed as the pan-
demic evolves and new information becomes available.
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This work has been conducted in the frame of 
the European Commission project FLURESP (Cost-
effectiveness assessment of European influenza 
human pandemic alert and response strategies) with 
the aim to define a set of scenarios to be used for a 
future pandemic planning (www.fluresp.eu).
Methods
Literature review and selection  of parameters
The literature search was conducted by consult-
ing Medline, restricting it to articles published until 
December 2011. Seven different sets of keywords were 
considered (Table 1).
A systematic selection  procedure was conducted in 
two steps by two researchers independently. In the first 
step, the major topics of the articles were assessed by 
title and abstract. In this phase of the selection  pro-
cedure, all articles reporting epidemiological data on 
influenza pandemics were included. In case of doubt 
on the article’s relevant information, the article was 
included in the second selection  step.
In the second step, the full text articles, previously 
selected , were assessed. These articles were included 
in the review if they reported at least one of the fol-
lowing 13 parameters: basic reproductive number (R0); 
clinical attack rate (CAR); age-specific CAR; case fatal-
ity rate (CFR); communicability/generation interval; 
modes of transmission; incubation period; timing and 
duration of pandemic; clinical consultation rate (CCR); 
hospital admission rate (HAR); intensive care admis-
sion rate (ICAR); work absenteeism; bed occupancy 
rate (BOR). If the articles included did not contain 
information on at least one of the parameters listed 
above or if the study design was of low quality (e.g. 
small sample size, unclear definition of outcomes), 
they were excluded. Moreover, pertinent related cita-
tions were considered.
Of each article included in the review, the following 
data were recorded: year of the study, year of pan-
demic referring to, country, and described parameters.
International technical reports were obtained by con-
sulting the websites of the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) and WHO. Influenza 
pandemic preparedness plans for the European Union/
European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries were 
obtained from the ECDC website [9]. We also consid-
ered relevant studies based on mathematical mod-
elling published in the literature but not retrieved 
through the search strategy.
Parameters collected through the literature review were 
subsequently discussed within the FURESP Project by a 
panel of experts composed of collaborators from inter-
national (WHO and ECDC) and national public health 
organisations (from France, Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom) who selected  the parameters to be used for 
defining scenarios.
Definition of severity profiles and scenarios
For each of the selected  parameters, four severity pro-
files were defined. In order to set the profiles, ranges 
of variability for each of the parameters were catego-
rised into a four-group scale, according to a quartile 
distribution. We then adjusted the ranges for each of 
the four groups, according to the suggestions made 
by the panel of experts. Based on the possible combi-
nation of the four severity profiles of each of the four 
parameters, a set of scenarios were defined.
Results
Parameters selected
From the literature review we collected information on 
13 parameters as potential candidates for defining the 
pandemic scenario. These parameters were divided 
into eight virus-related (R0; CAR; age-specific CAR; 
CFR; communicability/generation interval; modes of 
transmission; incubation period; timing and duration 
of pandemic) and five health-system-related (CCR; HAR; 
ICAR; work absenteeism; BOR).
The panel of experts was of the opinion that some of 
the parameters collected through the literature review 
were more relevant for mathematical modelling than 
for public health purposes, and others were considered 
less relevant for defining scenarios; consequently, all 
these were excluded: R0; age-specific CAR; communica-
bility/generation interval; modes of transmission; incu-
bation period; timing and duration of pandemic. For 
example, R0 (the average number of secondary infec-
tions produced by a single infected individual while 
Table 1
Sets of keywords used in searching scientific articles and 
number of articles retrieved for the study on pandemic 
influenza scenarios in Europe
Sets of keywords Original articles Reviews Total
‘Human influenza pandemic 
description’ 20 6 26
‘Influenza outbreak 
parameters estimation’ 7 0 7
‘Influenza scenario 
description’ 2 0 2
‘Influenza pandemic 
scenario’ 88 15 103
‘Influenza pandemic 
scenario description’ 2 0 2
‘Influenza pandemic 
parameter estimation’ 3 0 3
‘Influenza pandemic 
investigation’ 148 22 170
Total 270 43 313
The search was restricted to articles published until December 
2011.
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they are infectious, in an entirely susceptible popula-
tion), incubation period, and the generation interval 
(defined as the mean duration between time of infec-
tion of a secondary infected individual and the time of 
infection of their primary infector), are measures of the 
degree of transmissibility of an infection and in combi-
nation might affect CAR. Age-specific CAR in most of 
the considered influenza pandemics were derived from 
studies conducted in small and selected  communi-
ties not representative of the entire population, while 
the timing and duration of pandemic is expected to 
be from several weeks to a few months but will likely 
vary from country to country or within a single coun-
try. Therefore, these parameters were not considered 
in this study. Additionally, the contribution and clinical 
importance of potentially different modes of transmis-
sion of influenza are unknown and therefore were con-
sidered not relevant.
Thus, according to the opinion of the panel of experts, 
four parameters were selected  to be used for defining 
scenarios for pandemic planning. The two virus-related 
parameters are listed below with their limitations:
•	 CAR, the proportion of the population with clinical 
symptoms over a specified period of time. Some 
individuals may not develop symptoms severe 
enough to be readily identified as acute respira-
tory infection (ARI) or influenza-like-illness (ILI). 
The measured CAR is thus not always the number 
of individuals who actually develop symptoms, and 
may also include the number of individuals seek-
ing healthcare.
•	 CFR, represented by the proportion of individuals 
who develop influenza symptoms, and die because 
of complications. The measured CFR could be 
affected by the laboratory confirmation that may 
be unavailable to validate the total number of 
cases. Moreover, the confirmation is likely biased 
to more severe cases. This results in an overesti-
mation of the clinical severity of the disease, espe-
cially in case of people with underlying conditions 
that are at higher risk of death.
The health-system-related parameters deal with viru-
lence (i.e. the ability of the virus to invade the tissues 
of the host and produce pathologic effects and com-
plications) and impact (i.e. the effect on the health-
care sector) of the virus on the population. The most 
relevant health-system-resource utilisation parameters 
used to define pandemic scenarios are listed below 
with their limitations:
•	 HAR, represented by the proportion of population 
hospitalised for confirmed influenza independently 
from the presence of complications. This measure 
is strongly affected by how the healthcare systems 
in different countries are structured.
•	 ICAR, the proportion of hospitalisations for con-
firmed influenza that are treated in an intensive 
care unit (ICU) for influenza complications.
The ICAR could also be related to the level of virulence 
of the virus, since it is a proxy for the level of severity.
Literature review
A total of 338 documents (including technical reports 
and scientific articles and reviews) were identified 
using our search strategy with the seven sets of key-
words. Of these, 17 were duplicated articles and 238 
showed no relevant information on the selected 
parameters (Figure 1). In conclusion, 83 articles and 
documents reporting information on the parameters 
listed above were considered for this study. 
The year of publication of these documents ranges from 
2003 to 2011 with more than half of the documents pub-
lished between 2009 and 2010. When evaluating the 
performance of keywords’ combinations selected, 26% 
(83/321) of the detected documents provided useful 
information on the parameters for defining scenarios. 
The largest number of documents was detected using 
three sets of keywords (293/321, 91%) (Table 1).
The keywords combination ‘human influenza pandemic 
description’ provided the highest proportion of useful 
documents (10/28, 36%).
The range estimates for the parameters derived from 
the 83 selected  documents and their specific refer-
ences are listed in Table 2.
Figure 1
Flowchart outlining the selection of documents for the 
study on pandemic influenza scenarios in Europe
The search was restricted to articles published until December 2011.
Documents detected using seven combinations of keywords 
(n=338)
•	Most relevant official reports (n=327)
•	References detected indirectly (n=4)
•	Related articles in PubMed (n=7)
Documents with no 
relevant information 
(n=238)
Duplications (n=17)
Individual documents 
(n=321)
Documents available 
with some information 
on the parameters of 
interest (n=83)
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Of the 83 relevant articles, 23 articles reported infor-
mation on R0, with values ranging from 0.99 to 3.75. 
Thirty-four reported data on CAR, whose values ranged 
widely between 0 and 50%, while eight documents pro-
vided some information on age-specific CAR. For the 
CFR, 30 articles showed a range between 0 and 25%. 
Only three articles dealt with the generation interval, 
whose range was 1.6–4.1 days. The duration of infec-
tiousness, reported in five articles, ranged between 
one and 21 days. Only seven articles provided generic 
descriptions of possible modes of transmission: all 
of them reported the respiratory route by droplets of 
infected secretions and/or hand-face contact after 
touching a contaminated person or surface. The incu-
bation period, described in 12 articles, ranged from 
0.5 to seven days, while the pandemic duration varied 
from 0 to 180 days according to seven articles. Moving 
to health system resource utilisation parameters, CCR 
ranged from 14% to 73% (seven articles); HAR ranged 
from 0% to 27.5% (26 articles); ICAR ranged from 0% 
to 34% (13 articles); work absenteeism ranged from 0 
to 40% (seven articles); and BOR was between 0% and 
37% of total critical care bed capacity according to one 
article.
Parameters collected from historical influenza 
pandemics
We also investigated parameters collected during the 
three significant influenza pandemics that occurred 
in the 20th century: 1918/19, 1957/58, and 1968/69 to 
1969/70 (two waves) [5,10,11] (Table 3).
In some European countries (UK in particular) there 
were three waves associated with the 1918/19 pan-
demic [12]. In the UK, the wave structure of this pan-
demic is not well understood; the final 1919 wave may 
have been a separate pandemic of a different virus 
to the 1918 waves. The smallest of the waves was in 
July–August 1918, the largest second wave was from 
October 1918 to January 1919, and the third wave 
was from February to April 1919 [13]. Estimates of the 
national CAR vary in the UK, but suggest that nationally 
it was around 25% of the population (totalled over all 
waves). The highest CAR were observed in the young 
population. Estimates of the CFR are around 2%, rela-
tively evenly spread across the population, though with 
an excess in young adults [12]. The 1957/58 pandemic 
had one wave. Estimates of the CAR vary, but suggest 
that nationally it was around 30% of the population. 
Table 2
Range of values and references for the main parameters selected for the study on pandemic influenza scenarios in Europe
Parameters Minimum Maximum References
Reproductive number (R0) 0.99 3.75 [14, 34, 47–67]
Clinical attack rate (%) 0 50 [9,14,20,21–28,54,55,57,61,63,68,69,70–75,77–87]
Case fatality rate (%) 0 25 [9,14,20,27,31,42,54,57,59–62,66,70,71,73,75,82,83,88–98]
Generation interval (days) 1.6 4.1  [58,65,66]
Duration of infection (days) 1 21  [14,54,55,61,63]
Mode of transmission NA NA  [54,55,61,63,96,99,100]
Incubation period (days) 0.5 7  [14,20,26,33,48,54,63,66,69,76,99–102]
Pandemic duration (days) 0 180  [54,63,69,91,94,95,103]
Clinical consultation rate (%) 14 73  [24,52,54,55,61,76,104]
Hospital admission rate (%) 0 27.5  [24,31,32,42,52–55,61,63,65,69,70,71,75,77,82,88,90,91,94–96,105–107]
Intensive care admission rate (%) 0 34  [9,31,32,42,43,55,71,82,90,91,94–97]
Absenteeism (%) 0 40  [24,54,64,71,76,97,108]
Bed occupancy rate (%) 0 37  [109]
NA: not applicable.
Season Clinical attack rate (%)
Complication rate
(%)
Hospital admission rate
(%)
Case fatality rate
(%)
1918/19 25 20 4 2–3
1957/58 30 2.7 < 0.6 < 0.2
1968/69–1969/70 35 2.7 < 0.6 < 0.2
2009/10 5 5–16 in at-risk groups< 0.02–1 in healthy individuals < 0.02–1 < 0.048 (influenza-like illness rate)
Table 3
Relevant parameters collected in the four past influenza pandemics for the study on pandemic influenza scenarios in Europe
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Estimates of the CFR are around 0.1–0.2%. These 
average figures mask the considerable variation by 
age, most deaths being in the older adult population. 
However, the highest number of cases was registered 
in the young individuals [14]. The 1968/69 pandemic 
came in two waves in Europe [15]. Estimates of the 
national CAR vary, but based on comparisons with the 
epidemic in the United States (US), it may have been 
around 35% of the population [12]. Estimates of the CFR 
are less than 0.2%. These average figures for mortal-
ity mask the considerable variation by age, again, with 
most deaths recorded in the older adult population.
Parameters collected from the 2009 influenza pandemic
The recent influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009/10 pro-
duced no major signal of excess deaths in the overall 
population [16], and most of the EU countries have 
reported data on those that have died from confirmed 
2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) as a result of influ-
enza A(H1N1) virus infection, but case ascertainment is 
unlikely to have been complete, and the true number is 
almost certainly higher [17-19].
Rates from the ILI surveillance systems across Europe 
showed that consultations were highest in the young. 
There was only one wave, except for the UK where two 
‘waves’, one immediately following the other, were 
observed. There were high levels of background immu-
nity among elderly.
In general, estimates of the CAR for the 2009 pandemic 
influenza A(H1N1) vary among countries: 0.01% in the 
central region of Portugal [20], 0.072% in Mexico [21], 
18.3% in New Zealand [22], 30% in the Netherlands 
[23]. Across Europe the estimated CAR was 30% [24]. 
This variation reflects the different methods used to 
get the data: e.g. seroprevalence studies, epidemio-
logical studies in different populations, mathematical 
models, etc. Other experiences in smaller groups of 
population provide additional results: 3.15% in a train 
in China [25], 4% in a primary school in China [26], 22% 
on a Peruvian Navy ship [27], 28.5% during an outbreak 
investigation in Nepal [28].
In the UK, figures used to track the epidemic sug-
gest a CAR of 1–2% and modelling studies suggest 
that these estimates reflect only around 10% of those 
infected [29], which is consistent with the results of the 
serological analysis of the first wave [30]. If only half 
of those infected were symptomatic, although possibly 
with very mild symptoms (as this is typical for influ-
enza), the CAR would be around 5–10%. If so, estimates 
of the CFR are around 0.01% [31,32], but higher levels 
have been reported in the literature: up to 0.05% in the 
US [31], 0.1% in Spain [33], and 0.35% in Europe [24], 
0.6% in Mexico [34]. In terms of age groups, mortal-
ity was spread evenly across the age groups although 
most cases were reported in the younger age groups.
Definition of severity profiles and scenarios
Table 4, shows the severity profile for each of the 
four selected  parameters derived from the literature 
review and selected  by the suggestions of the panel 
of experts.
 
With regard to CAR, the literature review reported data 
ranging from 0 to 50%. Nevertheless, since the maxi-
mum value of 50% refers to the extreme value reported 
during the 1889 ‘Russian’ pandemic [13,35-39], this 
value was excluded and, therefore, CAR maximum 
value was set at 35%.
Also for CFR, from the literature review the observed 
values ranged from 0% to 25% (Table 2). However, 
some of the data collected from the literature review 
were estimates of CFR derived from different popula-
tions (often representing high-risk groups) and source 
of information (mortality associated with the 2009 
pandemic influenza A(H1N1) was estimated 15 times 
higher than reported laboratory-confirmed deaths) 
[40]. Moreover, when considering the influenza A(H5N1) 
avian influenza virus: CFR estimates reported by WHO 
for the ongoing outbreak is around 60% [41], even if, 
findings from a study based on surveillance and sero-
prevalence data published in 2008, reports estimates 
ranging from 14 to 33% [42]. For this reason we set 
the maximum level of the CFR at 2.5%, as most of val-
ues from recent pandemics ranged from 0.01 to 2.5% 
[13,14,32] (Table 3).
HAR depends on the level of virulence of the pan-
demic virus. However, its estimation may be affected 
by access to healthcare, proportion of chronic medical 
conditions in the population, pregnancy, and the virus 
characteristics (e.g. the level of pre-existing immunity, 
and pathogenicity of the virus itself). In our literature 
Table 4
Severity profile for the selected parameters, study on pandemic influenza scenarios in Europe
Parameters Type of parameters Severity profile (%)
Clinical attack rate Transmission 0–5 5–10 10–25 25–35
Case fatality rate Virulence 0–0.01 0.01–0.05 0.05–0.8 0.8–2.5
Hospital admission rate Use of medical 
resources
0–0.02 0.02–0.2 0.2–2 2–4
Intensive care admission rate 0–0.01 0.01–2.5 2.5–5 5–35
These severity profiles do not take into account any mitigation or control measures.
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review we obtained values ranging from 0 to 27.5%. As 
the extreme value refer to pandemic 1918/19 in the US 
Army Camps¸ according to the opinions of the panel of 
experts set the maximum value to 4% as this value was 
collected in the general population [5].
For ICAR, it ranged from 0 to 35% in the literature 
review, and we considered the maximum of 35% as 
‘reasonable worst case’ given that it was derived from 
an accurate evaluation of laboratory-confirmed influ-
enza hospitalised cases conducted in the US [43].
Based on the above described ranges of values, it is 
possible to define 256 different scenarios. Among 
these, we selected  six reasonable scenarios, accord-
ing to the opinion of the panel of experts (Figure 2).
In detail, scenario A represents a ‘seasonal-like’ influ-
enza outbreak; scenario B describes a situation in 
which the virus is quite diffusive, with an important 
HAR and a low virulence and ICAR, similar to the 2009 
pandemic. The high HAR in scenario B could also rep-
resent high-risk groups (e.g. elderly, individuals with 
underlying conditions). Scenario C and D represent a 
situation in which the CAR is high with a low and a high 
virulence, respectively. Moreover, since the scenarios 
described above do not take into account the age pro-
file of the population and the proportion of individuals 
with chronic conditions, we consider a reasonable 
solution to retain scenario E and F that represent the 
worst case scenarios for at-risk groups.
Discussion
In our study we defined a set of scenarios that may 
be useful for pandemic planning. We used the combi-
nation of four severity profiles of four epidemiologi-
cal parameters to identify 256 possible scenarios that 
can be adapted over time and are far from the classic 
scenarios structure used for pandemic plans up to the 
2009 influenza pandemic [1]. Among the scenarios 
identified, on the basis of a literature review and of 
the opinion of the panel of experts, we selected  the 
six most likely scenarios that synthesise the possible 
effect of an influenza outbreak with different charac-
teristics (from a seasonal-like to a major event).
Historically, influenza pandemic planning has been 
based on an assessment of the ‘reasonable worst 
case’, derived from previous influenza seasons and 
pandemics in the 20th century, and thus has shown 
not to be appropriate during a moderate event, such as 
the 2009 pandemic [44]. Other experiences reported 
a modelling approach using a combination of indica-
tors leading to a qualitative assessment in three lev-
els (i.e. mild, moderate and severe) [5]; that approach 
was considered not to be specific enough to guide 
Figure 2
Six possible scenarios identified by a combination of the selected parameters, study on pandemic influenza scenarios in Europe
CAR: clinical attack rate; CFR: case fatality rate; HAR: hospital admission rate; ICAR: intensive care admission rate.
The values of the parameters defining scenarios are highlighted in grey.
A
Type of 
parameters Parameters Scenario ‘seasonal-like’
Transmission CAR (%) 0–5 5–10 10–25 25–35
Virulence CFR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–0.05 0.05–0.8 0.8–2.5
Use of medical 
resources
HAR (%) 0–0.02 0.02–0.2 0.2–2 2–4
ICAR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–2.5 2.5–5 5–35
C
Type of 
parameters Parameters
Scenario ‘community risk, low 
virulence’
Transmission CAR (%) 0–5 5–10 10–25 25–35
Virulence CFR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–0.05 0.05–0.8 0.8–2.5
Use of medical 
resources 
HAR (%) 0–0.02 0.02–0.2 0.2–2 2–4
ICAR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–2.5 2.5–5 5–35
E
Type of 
parameters Parameters
Scenario ‘high-risk groups/age 
groups’
Transmission CAR (%) 0–5 5–10 10–25 25–35
Virulence CFR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–0.05 0.05–0.8 0.8–2.5
Use of medical 
resources 
HAR (%) 0–0.02 0.02–0.2 0.2–2 2–4
ICAR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–2.5 2.5–5 5–35
B
Type of 
parameters Parameters Scenario ‘2009 pandemic-like’
Transmission CAR (%) 0–5 5–10 10–25 25–35
Virulence CFR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–0.05 0.05–0.8 0.8–2.5
Use of medical 
resources 
HAR (%) 0–0.02 0.02–0.2 0.2–2 2–4
ICAR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–2.5 2.5–5 5–35
D
Type of 
parameters Parameters
Scenario ‘community risk, high 
virulence’
Transmission CAR (%) 0–5 5–10 10–25 25–35
Virulence CFR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–0.05 0.05–0.8 0.8–2.5
Use of medical 
resources
HAR (%) 0–0.02 0.02–0.2 0.2–2 2–4
ICAR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–2.5 2.5–5 5–35
F
Type of 
parameters Parameters Scenario ‘major event’
Transmission CAR (%) 0–5 5–10 10–25 25–35
Virulence CFR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–0.05 0.05–0.8 0.8–2.5
Use of medical 
resources
HAR (%) 0–0.02 0.02–0.2 0.2–2 2–4
ICAR (%) 0–0.01 0.01–2.5 2.5–5 5–35
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interventions [6]. Moreover, mathematical modelling 
based on preliminary epidemiological data is useful in 
defining the impact and the mitigation measures to be 
implemented during a pandemic. However, these mod-
els are strongly affected by the epidemiological param-
eters used and, even if they are able to explore a wide 
range of values, they need a specific set of scenarios 
to produce reliable results. For this reason, the use of 
scenarios in pandemic planning is crucial.
In our literature review, most of the selected  articles 
and documents were observational studies, mathe-
matical simulations, or reviews. Information referring 
to different world regions, different population sub-
groups and different influenza pandemics (mostly the 
2009 influenza pandemic) over 100 years-period made 
comparison of results difficult. In fact, our results 
showed that most of the parameters values vary a lot 
between different countries and in different pandem-
ics. For example, mortality rates often vary by age: age-
specific mortality rates for 1957/58 and 1968/69 show 
a U-shaped pattern with a slightly increased CFR in the 
very young and an increasing one with older age [45]. 
On the other hand, during the 1918 pandemic, a higher 
mortality rate was observed in young adults followed 
by lower rates in other age groups [35]. Moreover, vari-
ation in epidemiological parameters could also reflect 
differences in the surveillance systems (e.g. in case of 
different case definitions, time lag between influenza 
confirmation and death, etc.) and diagnostic methods. 
This heterogeneous information presented in the docu-
ments did not allow us to use parts of the data (e.g. 
the absolute number of deaths was neglected where 
the corresponding denominator to calculate CFR was 
missing). It should also be noted that we did not con-
sider age groups and the proportion of people with 
other underlying conditions that are strictly related to 
the vulnerability of the population to a pandemic virus 
[6]. Finally, estimates for the 2009/10 pandemic are 
likely to change as further data and studies become 
available after the literature review was conducted 
(December 2011).
The experience of the 2009 influenza pandemic 
showed that the EU countries had prepared for a pan-
demic of high severity but appeared unable to adapt 
their national and subnational responses adequately 
to a more moderate event. Knowledge of past pandem-
ics is of substantial help when planning for a future 
one [46] and indeed the epidemiological aspects of 
the three 20th century influenza pandemics (1918/20, 
1957/58, 1968/69) are of outstanding importance. 
However, modelling studies based on epidemiological 
parameters collected during the 20th century pandem-
ics overestimated the impact of the 2009/10 pandemic 
[8]. Furthermore, society has undergone major changes 
since 1918 (the scenario on which most pandemic plans 
and models before and during the 2009 pandemic have 
been based) and even since 1968, with an increased 
availability of ICUs and clinical countermeasures (such 
as vaccines, antivirals, etc.).
Thus, in June 2013, the WHO published the ‘Pandemic 
Influenza Risk Management’ [8]. The approach taken 
in this document introduces a risk-based approach to 
pandemic influenza risk management and encourages 
countries to develop flexible plans, and to conduct 
risk assessments in order to prioritise the develop-
ment of risk management programmes tailored to the 
hazards present. Our results are in line with the ‘WHO 
Pandemic Influenza Risk Management’ [8] and provide 
a description of possible scenarios of pandemic influ-
enza considering key epidemiological parameters. The 
described scenarios allow severity assessments and 
provide the basis for developing flexible risk manage-
ment plans over the course of a pandemic.
In the context of the FLURESP Project, the proposed 
scenarios have been used to select  potential response 
strategies (clustered and ranked according to perfor-
mance and efficiency using a multi-criteria analysis) 
in order to conduct cost-effectiveness evaluations to 
compare cost and performance of response strategies 
for each proposed scenario.
Our study, although not based on a standardised pro-
cedure, is supported by an extensive literature review 
and suggestions derived from a panel of experts.
In conclusion, our study provides an original template 
to categorise human influenza pandemic scenarios, 
useful for pandemic planning. Before using its out-
comes, limitations should be taken into account by 
public health authorities dealing with pandemic plan-
ning. This study is the first step of the FLURESP project, 
whose objective is to define adequate public health 
responses and measures according to each scenario 
presented in this paper and to compare performance 
and cost-effectiveness of such measures.
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